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Abstract
Employee shirking, where workers give less than full effort on the job, has
typically been investigated as a construct subject to group and organization-level
influences. Neglected are individual differences that might explain why individuals in
the same organization or work-group might shirk. The present study sought to address
these limitations by investigating subjective well-being (a dispositional construct), job
satisfaction, as well as other individual-level determinants of shirking behavior. Results
identified several individual-level determinants of shirking. Implications of the results
are discussed.
3INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF THE PROPENSITY TO SHIRK
Over the past decade considerable attention has been given to the issue of
employee work effort or, more accurately, the lack thereof. Concern over employee
shirking, as it is often caned, has led to the use of electronic monitoring in some
workplaces (Chalykoff and Kochan, 1989). Such practices have been met with
considerable disdain by employees who view this as an infringement upon their privacy
(Garson, 1988). Scholars in labor economics and organizational behavior who have
examined employee shirking have tended to approach the issue from the organizational
level, focusing primarily on various organizational practices which can be implemented to
discourage its occurrence (Groshen and Krueger, 1990; Jones, 1984; Kahn and Sherer,
1990). While these literatures have provided considerable insight into the issue, they
ignore individual-level determinants of shirking that might cause differences in the
propensity to shirk for similarly situated employees.
In this paper, we specify a model of individual-level determinants of shirking,
focusing on l) employee affect, 2) alternative employment opportunities, and 3) employer
monitoring. When subjected to empirical testing, the model performs very well. The
degree of employee shirking was found to depend significantly on employee levels of
subjective well-being and job satisfaction. Specifically, employees who are dissatisfied
with their jobs or are generally unhappy in life are more likely to shirk than employees
who are not. This suggests that employee shirking may be a manifestation of an adaptive
mechanism where employees shirk or engage in other withdrawal behaviors to cope with
personally unpleasant circumstances (Hulin, in press). The results provided mixed support
for the effect of labor market alternatives and monitoring on the degree to which
employees shirk.
SHIRKING AND ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICES
A basic premise underlying much of the shirking literature is that in the absence
of effective employer monitoring, employees will reduce their work effort (i.e., shirk).
4The reduction in work effort occurs because employees' interests do not necessarily
coincide with their employer's. If they can avoid detection, employees will prefer greater
amounts of on-the-job leisure for a given wage. This represents a serious problem to
firms since effective employer monitoring is often impractical due to costs and
difficulties associated with measuring employee productivity. These problems are thought
to be especially pronounced when there is collective production (Ouchi, 1977), particularly
when large work groups are involved because of the anonymity associated with large
group situations (Latane, Williams, and Harkins, 1979; Leibowitz and Tollison, 1980;
Weldon and Gargano, 1985).
Scholars in labor economics and organizational behavior have given considerable
attention to various policies firms can use to elicit an optimal level of employee work
effort. Two possibilities are generally discussed--encourage self-monitoring by employees
or improve the effectiveness of employer monitoring. Both types of literature suggest that
employer monitoring difficulties can be at least partially alleviated using various
compensation policies which increase self-monitoring by employees. 1 Because workers are
assumed to shirk when the utility gained from shirking exceeds the utiJity gained from
working, the policies suggested either increase the cost of shirking or conversely the value
of working.
Specific compensation poJicies commonly discussed in the economics literature are
1) the payment of supra competitive wages, i.e., efficiency wages (Akerloff, 1984; Shapiro
and Stiglitz, 1984; Yellen, 1984),2) the payment of wages that are at first below and then
later exceed current marginal product (Lazear, 1979, 1981), and 3) the use of
"tournaments" whereby workers compete for coveted top-paying positions (Lazear and
Rosen, 1981). Under efficiency wage and implicit contract models, increased work effort
on the part of employees is fear induced. Because of the favorable nature of the firm's
compensation scheme, employees value continued employment with the firm, and thus
avoid engaging in activities, such as shirking or malfeasance, which might lead to the
5termination of their employment. This differs from the tournament models where
increased productivity is thought to occur as a by-product of employee competition to win
the "prize." Recent empirical studies that have tested these models provide some support
for the productivity enhancing effects of these policies (Ehrenberg, 1990).
In the organization literature, expectancy theory (Lawler, 1973) and equity theory
(Lawler, 1968) are generally used to explain the existence of a positive relationship
between pay and productivity. Under expectancy theory, employees are thought to work
harder when they believe that hard work will be rewarded by the organization.
According to equity theory, an employee who perceives him or herself as being
overrewarded compared to some referent other will feel an inequity and seek to redress it
(Pritchard, 1969). This may lead to an increase in work effort on the part of the
employee. Similarly, employees who believe themselves to be underrewarded will respond
by decreasing their work effort. The arguments presented in equity theory are
conceptually similar to Akerloff's (1984) version of efficiency wage theory. Akerloff
(1984) argued that the firm gives workers a gift in the form of above market wages and
in exchange workers give the firm a gift in the form of higher productivity.
The organizational behavior literature has also focused on "the design of work
procedures or a control system that wiJl allow the monitoring and evaluation of the
employees' discrete performance" (Jones, 1985, p. 693). That is, attention is directed away
from encouraging self -monitoring on the part of employees to improving opportunities for
effective employer monitoring. Jones (1985) suggests two changes in organizational
structure which might reduce employee shirking. First, increasing the level of vertical
differentiation, and the consequent development of hierarchical authority, should increase
the effectiveness of supervisory monitoring, and hence reduce employee shirking. Second,
increasing the level of horizontal differentiation should lead to increases in monitoring
effectiveness "because supervisors will have a conception of appropriate subordinate
performance based on their own task knowledge" (Jones, 1985, p. 692). Unfortunately,
6there have not been any attempts to test the impact of these changes on employee
shirking.
In addition, work by Weldon and her associates (Weldon and Gargano, 1985; Weldon
and Mustari, 1988) suggests that group-level variables such as anonymity and shared
responsibility affect individual effort. Individuals who believe that responsibility for
task performance is shared by others presumably would exert less effort than those who
felt they bore sole responsibility for task performance. Indeed, their research provides
support for the importance of shared responsibility in student cognitive effort. However,
the studies have been conducted in the laboratory, where the manipulations and tasks bear
only indirect similarity to the world of work.
The basic theme found throughout these shirking literatures is that shirking is an
organizational problem which can be "corrected" via implementation of various
organizational polices. While few people would disagree that employee shirking represents
a serious problem which deserves remedial action, the organizational focus of the shirking
literature ignores its individual-level determinants. Greater attention must be given to the
fact that individual employees bring to the organization a "bundle" of characteristics
which significantly affect their participation within the organization. Further,
individuals working in similar work environments may form very different perceptions of
their job based on past experience and other personal characteristics (e.g., dispositions).
Attention must be given to personal characteristics of employees which will cause
differences in the degree of shirking to exist for employees who work under identical
working conditions or compensation schemes. Knowledge of individual-level determinants
of shirking may provide helpful information regarding possible remedies to shirking.
CONCEPTUAL MODEL
Employee shirking may be similar to employee withdrawal. Judge (1990) found
that those who were more likely to be absent, tardy, and miss meetings were also less
likely to give full effort on the job. Thus, existing literature on withdrawal behaviors
7may help identify individual-level determinants of shirking. Particularly appropriate in
this case is an employee's decision to quit his or her job. From the firm's perspective,
both employee quitting and employee shirking result in a decrease in an employee's
productive contribution to the firm. The difference between the two lies in degree.
When employees quit their jobs their contribution to the firm goes to zero, while the
decrease in contribution resulting from shirking depends on the level of employee
shirking. Further, since both the decision to quit one's job and the decision to shirk result
in either actual or potential termination of the employment relationship, these decisions
should be based on the employee's assessment of their current job and their alternative
employment opportunities. Just as "the relative attractiveness of one's current job should
negatively influence quitting" (Blau and Kahn, 198I, p. 565), the relative attractiveness of
one's current job should also negatively influence shirking.
Existing literature in economics and organizational behavior which examines
employee shirking and employees' decisions to quit their jobs suggests that employee
shirking should be significantly affected by an employees' job satisfaction2 and
dispositional affect (AFFECT), their alternatives in the labor market (LABMK T), and the
extent of employer monitoring (MONIT). That is,
SHIRKING = f(AFFECT, LABMKT, MONlT).
In this model, shirking is defined as a lack of employee work effort. Any
tendency on the part of workers to give less than full effort on the job would be shirking,
with greater deviations from] 00 percent effort representing greater levels of shirking.
This is clearly distinct from performance, where investigations of the relationship
between job satisfaction and performance have often yielded disappointing results
(Iaffaldano and Muchinsky, 1985; Schwab and Cummings, 1970). Kanfer (in press) and
Naylor, Pritchard, and Ilgen (1980) define many contingencies that make the relationship
between effort and performance far from perfect. Because of the complex nature of
performance, both in terms of its antecedents and measurements (Bernardin and Beatty,
81984), it has often been difficult to uncover consistent predictors of performance (Naylor
et aI., 1980). However, work effort is thought to be less subject to the complex array of
factors that influence performance. It may be more useful to investigate job satisfaction
as a predictor of effort, because effort is much more within the individual's control than
performance (Porter and Lawler, 1968; Schwab, Olian-Gottlieb, and Heneman, 1979).
Therefore, the inability of prior research to identify determinants of performance does
not imply that similar problems will exist when examining employee shirking.
Affect
Although affect can be directed toward, and derived from, many sources, a useful
distinction in organizational research may be to dichotomize affect as that experienced
from the job (i.e., job satisfaction), or that experienced in general (overall happiness or
well- being) (George, 1989). Job satisfaction has repeatedly been shown to predict
withdrawal and other work behaviors such as turnover, absenteeism, and tardiness (Hulin,
Roznowski, and Hachiya, 1985; Rosse and Miller, 1984). If workers dissatisfied with their
job are less likely to be at work through absence, tardiness, or quitting, they also might be
less likely to give full effort while on the job. In fact, Hulin et al. (I985) has expanded
upon the narrow range of withdrawal behaviors typically investigated by arguing that
many work role behaviors can be predicted by job satisfaction, and these isolated
behaviors are linked because they all entail taking actions to adapt to a job the worker
dislikes. Although Hulin et al. (I985) did not explicitly include shirking in their model,
given the conceptual similarity between shirking and other withdrawal behaviors such as
turnover reviewed above, it is reasonable to believe shirking will be predicted by job
satisfaction as well. Individuals dissatisfied with the conditions of their employment
contract are expected to be less inclined to work hard at their obligations under the
contract.
Similar predictions regarding the job satisfaction - shirking relationship can be
derived from recent developments in expectancy theory. Naylor et al. (I980) contended
9that work effort is likely to depend on the affect anticipated to result from one's efforts.
Individuals will direct their work efforts toward those activities most likely to result in
high satisfaction levels in the future. Hulin (in press) has argued that present satisfaction
levels may heavily influence anticipated affect. Therefore, it is possible that current
levels of job satisfaction will predict the level of effort expended by the worker.
A more general type of affect would include happiness and satisfaction with one's
life as a whole. While it has not often been related to job behaviors, dispositional
research has suggested that those unhappy with their life are more likely to be
dissatisfied with their job (Staw and Ross, 1985; Staw, Bell, and Clausen, 1986; Weitz,
1952), more likely to make attempts to change their behavior at work (George, 1989;
Judge, 1990), and less likely to display vigor for one's activities in life (Diener, 1984).
This lack of zeal may translate to the job, where unhappy employees might be more
willing to shirk their job responsibilities.
Labor Market Alternatives
The economic literature stresses the importance of alternative employment
opportunities as determinants of employee shirking (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). Since the
penalty for being caught shirking may be termination of employment, workers who have
more favorable alternative employment opportunities have much less to lose from
shirking. This suggests that the same factors which influence workers' decisions to quit
their jobs, i.e., search costs, should similarly affect employee shirking. Two factors should
be particularly important to employees in this regard--their experience with offers of
alternative employment and the expected duration of unemployment if fired for shirking.
Employees who anticipate little difficulty in obtaining alternative employment of similar
quality to their current employment will be less concerned with the consequences of
getting caught shirking on the job. As a result, personal characteristics of workers and
external labor market conditions which reduce the cost of job search would be expected to
increase the level of employee shirking.
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The role of the labor market in shaping withdrawal behavior has been investigated
in the organization literature as well. The importance of the perception of employment
opportunity and ease of movement with respect to turnover has been reviewed by Steel
and Griffeth (1989). As the authors point out, workers who feel it would take a long time
to find a comparable job or have no present alternatives in the labor market should be
more hesitant to quit. For the same reason, workers perceiving a long queue in the labor
market are expected to be less willing to bear the risk of shirking.
Monitoring
Consistent with the shirking literature, the degree to which an employee shirks
should depend to a large extent on the amount of employer monitoring, both actual and
perceived (Jones, 1985). Employees whose work is highly monitored, or who perceive their
work as highly monitored, should shirk less due to increases in the probability that
shirking wiIl be detected.
EMPIRICAL MODEL
In order to test the model put forth above, the following equation was estimated:
SHIRKING = f(SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING, JOB SATISFACTION, OFFER IN LAST
YEAR, TIME TO FIND A JOB OF COMPARABLE PAY, WAGE
RESIDUAL, MARITAL STATUS, AGE, CERTIFICATION, EDUCATION,
SPAN OF CONTROL, RACE).
The variables used in the analysis are described in Table I.
Table I about here
The variables SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING and JOB SATISFACTION are included
to measure the importance of job affect to a worker's propensity to shirk. Subjective
well- being is a concept from the personality literature that refers to the degree to which
individuals are happy and satisfied with their lives (Diener, 1984). It is closely related to
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measurements of affective disposition that have appeared in the organization literature
(Levin and Stokes, ]989; Staw et aI., 1986). This dispositional approach argues that the
ongoing affective state of the individual exerts a significant effect on individuals' work
attitudes and behaviors.
George (1989) expanded upon existing dispositional research by linking affective
states to withdrawal behaviors. She found that mood at work significantly influenced
number of days absent. Further, George's (1989) results indicated that mood also
significantly predicted intentions to leave the organization. If general affective states, as
manifested by subjective well-being, influence absenteeism and turnover intentions, it is
also reasonable to expect that they will exert significant influences on shirking behavior.
Because those unhappy may often engage in "mood repair" by trading work for leisure to
lift their spirits, workers with low levels of subjective well-being are hypothesized to be
more likely to shirk.
The second affective variable, job satisfaction, is also hypothesized to influence
shirking. Much past research has suggested that workers disliking their job are more
likely to engage in withdrawal or adaptive behaviors on the job. Behavioral examples
that past research has linked job satisfaction to include: quitting (Mobley, Horner, and
Hollingsworth, 1978; Price and Mueller, ]98]), absenteeism (Rosse and Miller, ]984),
tardiness (Adler and Golan, ]98]), retirement (Hanisch and Hulin, in press), and
unionization (Bigoness, 1978; Getman, Goldberg, and Herman; 1976 Hammer and Berman,
198]; Hamner and Smith, ]978; Kochan, ] 979). In light of Hulin et aI.'s (1985) suggestion
that these behaviors may be invoked as an adaptive response to individual's level of job
dissatisfaction, one means of coping with a job one dislikes is to simply spend less time
doing it. A]though job dissatisfaction has not been previously studied as a possible cause
of shirking, shirking can be expected to be adaptive just as much as any of the behaviors
suggested by Hulin et aI. (1985). In fact, quitting and being absent or late, due to
organizational sanctions and economic factors, may not be feasible for all workers. If
12
these alternatives are blocked, workers who dislike their jobs may shirk instead. As
suggested earlier, dissatisfied employees are expected to be less inclined to provide full
effort on their job. Therefore, it is hypothesized that job satisfaction will negatively
predict shirking.
The variables OFFER IN LAST YEAR, TIME TO FIND JOB OF COMPARABLE
PAY, CERTIFICATION, EDUCATION, WAGE RESIDUAL, AGE, and MARITAL
STATUS are all related to how an employee is likely to view their alternative employment
opportunities. Employees who have received other job offers, or who believe it would not
take long to find a job of comparable pay, will view shirking as being less costly. As a
result, TIME TO FIND JOB OF COMPARABLE PAY should be negatively associated with
the propensity to shirk and OFFER IN LAST YEAR should be positively associated with
the propensity to shirk.3 Further, the difference between the wage one would predict an
employee to have based on his or her individual characteristics and his or her actual wage
(i.e., WAGE RESIDUAL) should be positively associated with shirking. Consistent with
equity theory, employees who perceive themselves as being underrewarded relative to
their co-workers will reduce their work effort.
Due to their possible effects on productivity, and because they may serve as
signaIling devices, higher levels of education and professional certification are likely to
be valued in the labor market. Because of greater opportunities in the labor market
resulting from higher levels of education and professional certification, the consequences
of being discharged for shirking should be less onerous for those possessing these
characteristics. Thus, EDUCATION and CERTIFICATION should be positively associated
with the propensity to shirk.4 Past research on job search by U.S. workers indicates that
job changes are more likely to occur early in a person's working career (Hall, 1982),
suggesting that as workers get older, they prefer to remain with their current employer. 5
This preference to avoid late-career job changes suggests that older workers should be less
likely to engage in behavior such as shirking that might lead to termination of their
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employment. Finally, employees' marital status should affect their propensity to shirk.
Married employees are likely to have greater family responsibilities. The psychological
burden of providing, if only in part, for one's family may make workers less likely to
engage in behaviors that may endanger their dependents' source of support. Thus, being
married may increase the psychic cost of being caught shirking. In addition, marriage is
often thought to have a "stabilizing influence" on people (Viscusi, 1979) which could
reduce the extent to which they engage in "risky" behavior at work. These factors should
decrease the level of shirking for married employees compared to non married employees.
The last two variables in the equation, SPAN OF CONTROL and RACE, are
included to capture the effects of employer monitoring on employee shirking. The
number of employees reporting to each supervisor, SPAN OF CONTROL, should be
positively associated with employee shirking, other things equal. Employees who work in
departments where the number of employees per supervisor is high are less likely to get
caught shirking since supervisors have less opportunity to monitor individual employee's
behavior. Under these conditions the extent of employee shirking should increase.
Further, RACE should be negatively associated with the propensity to shirk. This
relationship is predicted because minority employees are likely to be subject to greater
scrutiny (or perceive themselves as being subject to greater scrutiny) at the workplace,
perhaps due to being seen as members of an outgroup (Pfeffer, 1983) and subjects of
tokenistic pressures (Kanter, 1977). As a result, minority employees are likely to face (or
perceive themselves as facing) a higher probability of being caught shirking than
nonminorities. This should make minorities more reluctant to shirk.
Methods
The data used for the analyses were collected from a survey of members of the
nursing profession at a large non unionized Midwestern clinic. Respondents included
medical office assistants, licensed practical and registered nurses, and nurse clinicians and
technicians. All but two respondents were women. Approximately 80% of those eligible
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completed usable surveys (n=252). Participation was completely voluntary and
confidentiality was emphasized to insure accurate responses. Respondents completed five
different subjective wen-being scales, chosen for their desirable measurement properties
described in Diener (1984). Workers also responded to questions assessing their job
satisfaction and reported if they had received an offer for alternative employment in the
last year, if they had been professionally certified, their educational attainment, age, race,
marital status, wage rate, and time it would take them to find a job of comparable pay.
It should be noted that all of the employees surveyed were subjected to the same company
policies and all were subjected to the same compensation practices. Thus, the study's
design controls for organizational practices which might cause differences to be observed
in the propensity of employees to shirk.
Shirking was assessed by asking the respondents how often they give 100% on the
job, and about their intentions to give less than 100% in the future. Intention
information has been found to be an accurate predictor of withdrawal behaviors (Hanisch
and Hulin, in press; Martocchio, 1989; Miller, Katerberg, and Hulin, 1979; Mobley et aI.,
1978; Rosse, 1983). In addition, the supervisor was asked to appraise how often the
respondent gives less than 100% on the job. Using a composite measure of individual and
supervisor report of past shirking behavior should yield an accurate measure of shirking,
short of the unlikely actual observation of shirking behavior by the researcher. In short,
the combination of supervisor and self-reports of shirking behavior should yield an
objective, and relatively direct, measure of shirking.
ESTIMA TION AND RESULTS
Estimates of the effect of the independent variables on shirking were obtained
using two estimation procedures. First, all independent variables except WAGE
RESIDUAL were assumed to be exogenous, and the equation was estimated using ordinary
least squares (OLS). Second, for reasons explained shortly, the equation was estimated
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allowing job satisfaction to be endogenously determined, and the resulting structural
equations model was estimated using LISREL 7 (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1989).
Because of the different measures used to assess shirking, job satisfaction, and
subjective well-being, confirmatory factor analysis was conducted. Confirmatory factor
analysis allows one to determine if the measures represent a common underlying construct
(Long, 1983). Weights and fit statistics derived from the confirmatory factor analysis
results yield an estimate of the degree to which each variable represents the common
construct. In order to estimate if the three measures of shirking adequately represented
and contributed unique variance to an underlying shirking construct, the three measures
of shirking were constrained to load on a single construct. All three measurement
loadings were statistically significant (p<.OI), indicating that each measure contributes
significant variance to the shirking construct. Results of the confirmatory factor
estimation for the overall measurement model revealed that the different measurements of
job satisfaction, subjective well-being, and shirking adequately represented their
respective constructs.6 For the other variables used in the analysis, no measurement
model is specified. They were treated as manifest and assumed to be measured with
negligible error. For example, it was assumed that certification, age, race, and so forth
were reported by the employee with a minimum of error.
WAGE RESIDUAL, as described in Table 1, and for reasons explained earlier, is
the residual of actual minus predicted wage. The endogenous estimation of wage was
based on the following structural equation:
WAGE=f(TRAINING, EDUCATION, EXPERIENCE, EXPERIENCE2, CERTIFICATION,
AGE, RACE).
The coefficient of determination for this equation was .46. The actual minus predicted
values were included in the shirking equation.
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Results with Job Satisfaction Treated as Exogenous
Table 2 provides results of the OLS estimation. Standardized and unstandardized
estimates are provided. Table 2 indicates that several significant influences on shirking
were identified. As hypothesized, whites were significantly more likely to shirk. Married
workers were slightly less likely to shirk. Education led to slightly higher levels of
shirking. Also as hypothesized, older workers were significantly less likely to shirk.
Finally, both those dissatisfied with their job and unhappy in general (low subjective
well-being) were significantly more likely to shirk, consistent with past dispositional and
withdrawal research.
Table 2 about here
It is possible that job satisfaction and perceived labor market alternatives interact
in determining shirking behavior. A dissatisfied worker may engage in several reactive
behaviors, perhaps the first choice being quitting (depending on the labor market). This
raises the possibility that only workers with few labor market alternatives will react to
job dissatisfaction by shirking (those that have more options may react by quitting).
However, an interaction between job satisfaction and perceived time to find a job of
comparable pay did not add a significant amount of variance when added to the shirking
equation.
Span of control was not significant, suggesting that closeness of supervision does
not lead to less shirking. Overall, it was somewhat surprising that some of the variables
were not significant in the equation. It was thought that perhaps one explanation might
be that there was little variation in the nonsignificant variables. Obviously, independent
variables that have little variance themselves have less power to explain variance in the
dependent variable. For example, labor market variables could not explain much variance
in job satisfaction if members of the sample differed little in their perception of market
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conditions. If this were the case, the labor market variables would not represent a valid
test of the influence of the market on shirking. However, the coefficients of variation
for the perceived labor market variables were not smaller than the significant variables
(e.g., C(v)=.98 for CERTIFICATION, C(v)=l.06 for OFFER IN LAST YEAR, C(v)=.28 for
WAGE RESIDUAL, C(v)=.38 for TIME TO FIND A JOB OF COMPARABLE PAY,
C(v)=.41 for EDUCATION, C(v)=.22 for JOB SATISFACTION, and C(v)=.13 for
SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING). Nonetheless, a multi-profession/occupation sample, facing
a different labor market, is needed to examine the replicability of the present findings.
Results with Job Satisfaction Treated as Endogenous
The dispositional studies on job satisfaction reviewed earlier have strongly
suggested that job satisfaction depends on worker well-being (Staw and Ross, 1985; Staw
et aI., 1986; Weitz, 1952). It is also quite possible that job satisfaction is endogenously
determined by many of the other variables in the model. Wages (Dyer and Theriault,
1976; Heneman, 1985; Miceli and Lane, in press), education (Jencks, Perman, and
Rainwater, 1988; Kalleberg, 1977; Weaver, 1977), and labor market factors (Hulin, in
press; Hulin et aI., 1985; Rosse and Hulin, 1985) all have been identified by past research
as influences on job satisfaction. Because many of these variables may indirectly
influence shirking as mediated through job satisfaction, the total (direct plus indirect)
effect of some of the independent variables on shirking may be understated by failing to
account for the endogenous nature of job satisfaction. The job satisfaction equation was:
JOB SATISFACTION = f(WAGE RESIDUAL, CERTIFICATION, TIME TO FIND
JOB, SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING, OFFER IN LAST YEAR,
EDUCA TION)
The predicted values for job satisfaction were substituted for the actual values in the
shirking equation. The coefficient of determination for this equation was .28. Specific
coefficient estimates for the job satisfaction equation are not reported here but are
available upon request.
18
Using maximum likelihood estimation with job satisfaction treated endogenously
did not substantially affect the OLS results reviewed earlier. Table 3 reveals that all
variables significant in the OLS estimation, with the exception of education and marital
status (which were only marginally significant in the OLS equation), remain significant in
the maximum likelihood estimation. Thus, the maximum likelihood estimation generally
confirms the results reported in Table 1. LISREL provides several statistics on the overall
fit of the model. All fit statistics, reported in Table 3, indicate that the data fit the
hypothesized model very well (see La Du and Tanaka, 1989, for a review of these fit
statistics). The total effects of the independent variables were similar to the direct
effects reported in Table 3, with the exception that subjective well-being had a
significant indirect effect (-.126; p<.05) on shirking, making the total effect -.294 (p<.OI).
Table 3 about here
Because shirking was argued to be an adaptive behavior invoked in response to job
dissatisfaction, it is possible that shirking will affect workers' current level of job
satisfaction. In response to this possibility, shirking was added to the job satisfaction
equation. The coefficient on shirking was not significant, nor did the addition of
shirking improve the fit of the overall structural model. It may be that shirking does not
have a simultaneous effect on job satisfaction, but perhaps only an effect realized over
time. Future research utilizing longitudinal data would be particularly useful in this
regard.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The results of this study provide several contributions to the shirking literature.
First, this study provides the first attempt to operationalize shirking. Previous empirical
research on employee shirking has tended to use some measure of employee productivity
as a measure of shirking. Although such measures are useful, they are measures of
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shirking outcomes rather than shirking itself. We have abandoned this practice by
developing a measure of shirking which relies on both employee and supervisor
assessments of work effort.
Second, we have developed a model of employee shirking which includes measures
of job satisfaction and employee affect (subjective well-being). Previous discussions of
employee shirking have failed to recognize the possible importance of these variables as
determinants of shirking. Our findings indicate that these factors significantly impact
the extent of employee shirking. With regard to job satisfaction, the results suggest that
identification of possible sources of job dissatisfaction and the implementation of
corrective programs can significantly reduce shirking. This provides an additional avenue
which can be pursued by firms wishing to increase employee productivity.
The findings related to employee affect are of less practical importance, since
considerable practical and ethical issues are involved in altering the happiness of
organizational members. Nonetheless, the significant, negative effect of subjective well-
being on employee shirking is of interest. It has extended the dispositional approach by
linking shirking to subjective well-being. The role of dispositional states such as
subjective well-being, then, has been found not to be confined to job satisfaction, but
influences an important work behavior as well. While it may be difficult (and perhaps
unethical) for organizations to change dispositional tendencies, the fact that those
unhappy in life are more likely to shirk is an important fact for both organizations and
workers to consider. Further, because subjective well-being is related to job satisfaction,
it also includes an indirect effect on shirking. The significant total effect of subjective
well-being on shirking indicates that shirking is not wholly determined by organization
policies and practices. While this does not imply that shirking behavior is immutable, it
does add to the existing set of variables thought to influence shirking behavior.
Third, our results suggest that employees who have the most to lose from shirking
shirk less, although perhaps only to a modest degree. Specifically, our results indicate
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that older employees, and to an uncertain extent married and less educated employees,
will shirk less. The negative relationship observed between age and shirking appears to
be consistent with prior research indicating that older workers are less inclined to change
jobs (Hall, 1982). However, it should be noted that since age is likely to be highly
correlated with tenure, this finding may also indicate that workers who shirk less are
likely to be employed by the firm longer. That is, rather than representing behavioral
differences between older and younger workers, this finding may simply indicate that this
firm has been successful in identifying and ridding itself of employees who demonstrate a
greater propensity to shirk.
Interestingly, the number of offers received by an employee in the past year, the
difference between an employee's predicted and actual wages, and an employee's
perception of the amount of time it would take to find a job of comparable pay, did not
have significant effects on shirking. It seems somewhat surprising that these more direct
measures of relative employment opportunities are insignificant, while the personal
characteristic variables were significant. One explanation could be that all these
variables are so highly interrelated that inclusion of all of them in the estimating
equation decreases the probability that they will obtain statistical significance.7
However, the multiple correlation coefficient between OFFER IN LAST YEAR and the
variables AGE, MARITAL STATUS, EDUCATION, TIME TO FIND JOB OF
COMPARABLE PAY and WAGE RESIDUAL is only .22. The multiple correlation
coefficient between TIME TO FIND JOB OF COMPARABLE PAY and these variables is
only .23. These correlations do not constitute anything close to collinear relations; thus
the relatively weak relationships between these variable and shirking is not due to
inflated standard errors caused by strong relationships between the independent variables.
Of course, it is also possible that labor market factors are not determinative of the
degree of employee shirking. The labor market hypothesis presupposes market rationality
in shirking decisions. The role of dispositional tendencies suggests that not all of the
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variance in shirking is due to weighing inducements versus contributions from the job
with an eye toward alternatives in the labor market. Interestingly, Steel and Griffeth's
(I989) meta-analysis of the effect of perceived labor market variables on turnover yields
the same weak effect. Gerhart (in press) and Steel and Griffeth (I989) suggest that
samples of occupationally heterogeneous workers would likely yield higher effects of
perceived employment opportunity on turnover. Given the relatively narrow range of
occupations in the present sample, the same argument may apply to shirking behavior.
Finally, the results related to employer monitoring were mixed. The coefficient
estimate on SPAN OF CONTROL was not significant. This indicates that increased
opportunities to monitor employee behavior which result from a lower employee to
supervisor ratio does not significantly reduce shirking. This finding appears to be
inconsistent with evidence reviewed earlier. However, several caveats are in order. First,
the work being performed by respondents in this study tends to be unstructured and
requires specialized skills, both of which make monitoring more difficult (Jones, 1984).
Second, responsibility for tasks is generally not shared. This makes an employee's
individual output identifiable, thus providing disincentives for employees to shirk
(Harkins and Petty, 1982). Finally, the tasks engaged in by these health care professionals
may be of such importance as to provide sufficient motivation for performance, as
suggested by Hackman and Oldham (I980). These job/career related effects may very
well have negated any shirking effects generally associated with increased opportunities
for direct supervision.
With regard to race, the results indicate that black employees shirk less than non-
blacks. As indicated previously, these results may indicate that black employees believe,
rightly or wrongly, that they face a higher probability of being caught shirking and thus
shirk less than nonblacks. However, acceptance of this interpretation is subject to some
criticism. One could argue, for instance, that the same conditions which cause black
employees to fear being caught shirking are likely to cause black employees to
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underestimate the degree to which they shirk. Thus, this finding should be interpreted
cautiously.
By demonstrating the importance of individual-level determinants of shirking, this
study suggests the need to expand future research on this issue beyond its current focus
on organizational factors. Future research should also define the type of work and jobs
in which shirking is a relevant construct. Although shirking is a lack of work effort, it
may only be a relevant construct where there is group responsibility for performance. If
performance is not co]]ective, task responsibility cannot be assumed by another party. In
addition, future studies on the impact of organizational practices on employee shirking
should al10w for the possibility that their effects may depend on specific employee
characteristics. The results of the present study suggest that given organizational policies
and practices, individual characteristics significantly influence whether or not shirking
wi1l occur. Advancements in this area along with existing literature on organizational
factors affecting shirking should greatly assist managers in their effort to combat
problems associated with employee shirking. However, given the stability of most of these
individual-level characteristics, altering the level of shirking may not be as simple as
many researchers investigating the phenomenon have previously assumed.
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TABLE 1
Variables Used in the Analvsis of the ProDensitv to Shirk
SHIRKING is a composite variable comprised of 3 measures: 1) worker report of how
often they had given less than 100% in the past; 2) worker report of their intentions to
give 100% in the future; 3) supervisor report of how often the worker had given less than
100% in the past. All three were assessed on a 1-5 point scale.
SPAN OF CONTROL is a continuous variable representing the number of employees
reporting to each supervisor in the worker's department.
RACE is a dichotomous variable representing worker's race
(1=whi te; O=otherwise).
WAGE RESIDUAL is a continuous variable representing the difference between the
workers' actual hourly wage rate and the wage rate that one would predict them to have
based on their personal characteristics.
CER TIFICA TION is a dichotomous variable representing if the worker has been
professionally certified (1=yes; O=no).
TIME TO FIND A JOB OF COMPARABLE PAY is a variable representing the estimated
time it would take a worker to find a job of comparable pay measured on a 1-6 point
scale (l=a day or two; 6=about 2 years).
SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING represents the average level of overall happiness the worker
has experienced in the past. It is a composite variable comprised of three continuous
scales and two single-item measures. The reliabilities of the continuous scales ranged
from .86 to .92.
MARITAL STATUS is a dichotomous variable representing if the worker is married
(1=yes; O=no).
AGE is a continuous variable representing the age of the worker.
OFFER IN LAST YEAR is a dichotomous variable representing whether the worker
received an offer in the past year (1=yes; O=no).
JOB SATISFACTION represents the level of job satisfaction workers have with five
components of their job (pay, promotion, supervision, co-workers, and the work itself),
measured by the Job Descriptive Index (Smith, Kendall, and Hulin, 1969). Scale
reliabilities ranged from .85 (work satisfaction) to .92 (promotion satisfaction).
EDUCA TION represents the highest educational attainment achieved by the worker
measured on a 1 to 5 point scale (1=high school diploma, 5=master's degree).
TRAINING represents the level of training of the worker measured on a 1 to 5 scale
(1=medical office assistant; 2=liscenced practical nurse; 3=registered nurse without
Bachelor of Science in Nursing; 4=registered nurse with Bachelor of Science in Nursing;
S=clinical specialist or certified nurse practitioner (Masters degree required).
EXPERIENCE is a continuous variable representing the number of years of occupational
experience of the worker.
Unstandardized Standardized Standard
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Error
Span of Control -0.0004 -0.006 0.004
Race 1.089* 0.122 0.547
Wage Residual -0.001 -0.002 0.035
Certification -0.032 -0.014 0.140
Time to Find Job of
Comparable Pay 0.040 0.030 0.081
Subjective Well-being -0.007* -0.126 0.004
Marital Status -0.199+ -0.079 0.156
Age -0.021** -0.174 0.007
Offer in Last Year -0.065 -0.029 0.141
Job Satisfaction -0.017** -0.230 0.005
Education 0.103+ 0.085 0.076
Intercept -0.415 0.644
R2 0.15
N 252
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TABLE 2
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES PREDICTING SHIRKING BEHAVIOR
+
* **p < .10; P < .05; P < .01 (one-tailed test).
Parameter Standard
Estimate Error
-0.025 0.078
0.162* 0.079
-0.036 0.079
-0.004 0.081
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TABLE 3
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES PREDICTING SHIRKING BEHAVIOR
Span of Control
Variable
Race
Wage Residual
Certification
Time to Find Job of
Comparable Pay 0.024 0.080
Subjective Well-being -0.182* 0.104
Marital Status -0.082 0.079
Age
-0.225** 0.079
Offer in Last Year -0.034
-0.221*
0.082
Job Satisfaction 0.115
Education 0.083 0.080
R2 0.22
N 252
Chi-Square/Degrees of Freedom 1.477
Goodness of Fit Index 0.919
Root Mean Square Residual 0.055
* **p < .05; P < .01 (one-tailed test).
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Notes
1 A study by Robert M. Hutchens (1987) indicates that the presence of monitoring
difficulties causes firms to implement specific compensation policies to minimize
employee shirking.
2 Of course, job satisfaction is not solely an individual difference variable; technology,
work structuring, and compensation practices are a few of the many organization-level
variables that may influence job satisfaction. However, job satisfaction is inherently a
personal judgment subject to many perceptual influences unique to the individual (Hulin,
Roznowski, and Hachiya, 1985) and thus can reasonably be construed as a variable that is
likely to differ between individuals.
3 Because one's perception of alternative employment opportunities may depend on the
factors that actually cause alternative employment opportunities, it is possible that
estimated time to find a job of comparable pay is endogenously determined in the
equation. Therefore, time to find a job of comparable pay was regressed on education,
certification, and offer in the last year, and those predicted values were subst.ituted into
the shirking equation. No coefficients changed significance. Therefore, the'treatment of
time to find a job of comparable pay as exogenous does not significantly affect the
results presented later.
4 As pointed out by Wallace Hendricks on an earlier draft of this paper, if EDUCATION
and CERTIFICATION represent ability, these factors may also be positively related to
shirking because high ability employees would not have to work as hard as those with
lower abilities to meet the performance standards existing within the firm.
5 See Hutchens (1988) for a discussion of why older workers might prefer to avoid late
career job changes.
6 The fit statistics were (see La Du and Tanaka, 1989, for explanations): Chi-
square=78.58; Chi-square/degrees of freedom=1.27; Goodness of Fit Index=.935; Root Mean
Square Residual=.049. All measurements significantly loaded on their respective factors
(p<.OI).
7 Examination of the simple correlation matrix does not indicate problems with
multicollinearity. Nonetheless, such problems may still exist if high correlations are
present among more than just pairs of variables.
